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Abstract 
We evaluate the effects of a reduction in sick pay from 100 to 80% of the wage. Unlike 
previous literature, apart from absence from work, we also consider effects on 
doctor/hospital visits and subjective health indicators. We also add to the literature by 
estimating both switch-on and switch-off effects, because the reform was repealed two years 
later. We find a two-day reduction in the number of days of absence. Quantile regression 
reveals higher point estimates (both in absolute and relative terms) at higher quantiles, 
meaning that the reform predominantly reduced long durations of absence. In terms of 
health, the reform reduced the average number of days spent in hospital by almost half a day, 
but we cannot find robust evidence for negative effects on health outcomes or perceived 
liquidity constraints. 
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Sickness pay, absenteeism, health expenditure, hospitalization, difference-indifferences, 
switch on, switch off, quantile regression, intrinsic motivation. 
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1  Introduction 
Sick pay and disability insurance programs, while reducing exposure to risk and 
seeking to promote equity through support of people in need, entail moral hazard problems. 
Several studies on U.S. and Canadian disability schemes find negative labor supply and 
positive take-up effects of increased benefit generosity as well as effects of economic 
conditions on benefit take up (Black, Daniel and Sanders, 2002; Gruber, 2000; Johnson and 
Ondrich, 1990; Kreider and Riphahn, 2000; Meyer, Viscusi and Durbin, 1995; Neuhauser 
and Raphael, 2004; on screening, see Campolieti, 2004). Gruber (2000) stresses that the U.S. 
disability program is “one of the largest social insurance programs” with an expenditure that 
amounts to $46 billion, which was 0.13% of U.S. GDP in 1998.  
Unlike the U.S. or the U.K., several continental European countries require employers 
to provide sick pay from day one of each sickness spell. In Germany, Europe’s largest 
economy, sick pay is 100% of the wage for the first six weeks of sickness. Combined with 
the high level of employment protection typical of many continental European economies, 
these regulations make absence hard to sanction.
1 As a consequence, presence at the 
workplace is – at least in the short run when promotion is disregarded – a form of voluntary 
cooperation by the worker. Absence from work carries a high cost in terms of workdays lost, 
with rates ranging from 2.0% in the U.S. to 4.2 or 7.2% in continental European countries 
like Germany or France, respectively (Osterkamp, 2002). If the cost of sick pay regulations in 
Germany were compared to the U.S. disability program, a back-of-the envelope calculation 
would dwarf the size of the U.S. disability program in terms of percentage of GDP spent in 
the respective country: if labor contributed two-thirds to the GDP, a reduction in working 
days lost from the German to the U.S. level would raise the GDP by about 2.2 x (2/3) = 
                                                             
1 In Germany and Sweden, a worker can remain absent from work for 2 and 7 days, respectively, without a 
physician’s certificate (Johansson and Palme, 2005; Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001).  
2 
1.5%, more than eleven times the cost of the U.S. disability program in percentage of U.S. 
GDP.
2  
In this study, we extend the recent literature using natural experiments to estimate the 
effects of incentives on absence (Henrekson and Persson, 2004; Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; 
Johansson and Palme, 2002, 2005; Riphahn, 2004; Riphahn and Thalmaier, 2001). However, 
unlike previous studies, we do not only consider absence from work as an outcome, but also 
estimate the reform’s effects on health-related outcomes like the duration of hospital stays 
and subjective health indicators and show that moral hazard problems of sick pay extend to 
inefficient use of the medical system. We further add to the literature by estimating the 
effects of the introduction (switch on) and then repeal of a reform (switch off) that reduced 
sick pay in Germany from 100 to 80% of the wage. Methodologically, because this reform 
affected only workers not covered by collective bargaining contracts, we can apply a 
difference-in-differences identification strategy to German Socio-Economic Panel data so as 
to distinguish the effects of the reform from time- or group-specific effects. Fixed-effects 
regressions provide an additional control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. 
The relationship between financial incentives and absence is amply shown in earlier 
papers using regression analysis on observational data (i.e., without natural experiments). 
Fewer studies, however, use natural experiments to relate the cost of absence to its incidence 
or duration. Ichino and Riphahn (2005), Riphahn and Thalmaier (2001), and Riphahn (2004) 
exploit probationary periods or time to reach virtually “undismissable” status as a natural 
experiment which leads to high employment protection. The authors find that absence rates 
increase with employment protection in Italy and Germany. For Sweden, Henrekson and 
Persson (2004) use time series data for 1955–1999 to show that reforms that make sick pay 
more generous increase absence from work and vice versa. Likewise, Johansson and Palme 
                                                             
2 Admittedly, this number may be somewhat lower if genuinely sick employees going to work are not only less 
productive but may also decrease the productivity of others through infection, yet 1.5% of the GDP is a large 
enough number to illustrate the potential importance of policies affecting workers’ absence.  
3 
(2002, 2005) use person-level data to evaluate the Swedish sick pay reform of 1991, which 
resembled that investigated here for Germany but applied only to blue-collar workers. The 
authors identify reactions to the incentives created by the reform: both the incidence and the 
duration of absence decreased when the cost of absence increased.  
This present paper investigates the case of the late 1996 German reform that reduced 
sick pay from 100 to 80% during the first 6 weeks of sickness for workers without collective 
bargaining contracts. However, unlike previous studies using natural experiments to evaluate 
the incentives linked to sick pay, we can also evaluate the effects of the early 1999 repeal of 
the reform, which re-set sick pay to 100% of the wage rate from day 1. Apart from absence 
from work (the outcome considered in the previous literature), we also evaluate the reform’s 
effects on use of the medical system and on subjective health indicators. Specifically, we find 
that for workers aged 20 to 55 years who remained with their firm during the estimation 
period, the average number of days absent from work fell by 2.4 days per year (according to 
a fixed-effects estimate). Furthermore, we show that the reform particularly reduced long 
durations of absence and that part of this decrease (0.4 days) coincides with a reduction in the 
average number of days spent in hospital, although we cannot find any robust effects of the 
reform on subjective health indicators. The results also indicate that the switch-on effects of 
the reform might be slightly smaller than the switch-off effects on absence from work. 
However, this difference is not statistically significant. Altogether, it seems that the reform 
reduced the – in international comparison – long and frequent contacts of Germans with their 
health care system. These contacts are costly both for employers and the health care system, 
but their reduction due to the sick pay reform seemingly had no statistically robust negative 
effects on subjective health indicators or in terms of long-term sickness. We also find no 
negative effects of the reform on liquidity constraints, measured as the perception of financial 
security in case of sickness. 
  
4 
2  Sick Pay in Germany 
Germany has one of the most generous sick pay regulations among industrialized 
countries. German federal law dictates that employees reporting sick are entitled to 100% of 
their pay for the first 6 weeks of sickness, to be paid by the employer (Bundesministerium 
der Justiz, 2003; Schmitt, 2005). Only after this period does the percentage reduce to the 70% 
covered by mandatory health insurance (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2008).
3 Moreover, in 
contrast to regulations in the U.S., the U.K. or Switzerland, German federal law regulates 
sick pay for the first few days of illness (Osterkamp, 2002).  
As of October 1, 1996, the Christian Democrat and Liberal coalition government 
reformed the federal law regulating sick pay in Germany so that all employees (whether blue- 
or white-collar) were entitled to only 80% (rather than 100%) of their previous wage from 
day 1 of sickness through the first 6 weeks of absence (Schmitt, 2005).
4 This law, however, 
was heavily resisted by the trade unions, which prior to 1970 had fought for years to gain 
100% sick pay for all workers. Hence, the implementation of the new law was followed in 
1996 and 1997 by a plenitude of lawsuits (each referring to a particular collective bargaining 
contract) in which the unions argued that collective bargaining contracts based on the old 
version of the law were still valid and implied sick pay corresponding to 100% of the wage. 
According to Bispinck and WSI-Tarifarchiv (1997), these lawsuits were generally won. 
                                                             
3 Some employees are subject to more generous sick pay rules arrived at through collective bargaining 
agreements. For example, public sector employees already in place before July 1, 1994, receive sick pay of 
100% of their wage for more than 6 weeks depending on their tenure (9, 12 15, 18 and 26 weeks for 2, 3, 5, 8 
and 10 years of tenure, respectively). For public sector employees hired after this date, the 6-week rule 
applies (Clemens et al., 2006). However, after the first 6 weeks, public sector employers must pay an 
additional allowance into the 70% sick pay covered by the mandatory health insurance. Such allowances in 
addition to health insurance sick pay after the sixth week of sickness also exist in other sectors of the 
economy and depend on the specific collective bargaining contract.  
4 Besides reducing the sick pay covered by the employer for the first 6 weeks, the January 1, 1997, changes to 
the law on mandatory health insurance reduced sick pay from the 7th week onwards (covered by mandatory 
health insurance) from 80 to 70% (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 1996). This type of sick pay is paid for up 
to 78 weeks within 3 years for a single type of sickness (Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2008). It should also 
be noted that this reform (the reduction from 80 to 70%) had not been reversed by the time of writing. There 
was also a small reform of hospital stay co-payments. In 1994, co-payments were DEM 14 ( 7) per day in 
Western Germany and DEM 9 ( 4.50) in Eastern Germany. In 1997, they were slightly raised to DEM 17 
( 8.50) and DEM 14 ( 7) in Western and Eastern Germany, respectively. Although the reform of 1997 
  
5 
Hence, as of December 1997, over 15 million employees were covered by collective 
bargaining contracts that guaranteed them sick pay of 100% of their wage, which implies full 
coverage of about 55% of all employees (not counting civil servants, who were not affected 
by the reform). Indeed, according to a 1998 publication by the German Parliament 
(Deutscher Bundestag), 80% of employees were receiving sick pay corresponding to 100% of 
their wage, and the remaining 20% were largely those not covered by collective bargaining 
contracts (Deutscher Bundestag, p. 17).
5  
This group of workers without collective bargaining coverage comprise our treatment 
group, which we compare to the control group of workers covered by collective bargaining 
contracts using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Nevertheless, some 
measurement error can be expected in the treatment status for two major reasons. First, some 
workers in our control group did in fact receive “treatment” because their collective contract 
did not provide for sick pay covering 100% of their wage. Second, more workers received 
treatment immediately after the reform became effective (October 1, 1996) than by the 
middle of 1997 or later because it took time for lawsuits to establish that the old rules applied 
for most workers covered by collected bargaining. Both these sources of measurement 
(classification) error are likely to lead to an attenuation bias; that is, because estimates of the 
treatment effect are biased toward zero, the true effects might be larger than those estimates.
6 
However, we assessed the second measurement problem by producing estimates using only 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
concurs with the treatment period, the raise of co-payments by  1.50 in Western Germany ( 2.50 in Eastern 
Germany) is minute compared to the cut in wages by 20 percent for each sickness day.  
5 We could not find other statistics on the share of employees who still obtained 100% of their wage as sick pay. 
We did contact all major trade unions, but most information they provided referred to regulations in specific 
contracts rather than statistics on the number of employees covered by different sick pay regimes. 
6 As surveyed in Bound, Bown and Mathiowetz (2001, p. 3725), classification error (measurement error in a 
binary variable) usually leads to bias towards zero, unless classification error is so prevalent that the sign of 
the estimate actually changes. The statement by the German parliament (Deutscher Bundestag) above in the 
text, however, suggests that the overlap between collective bargaining coverage and not being affected by the 
reform turned out to be almost perfect so that we have to assume that classification error leads to small 
attenuation bias in our application. In the difference-in-differences context, the classification bias affects the 
coefficient of the dummy variable of the treatment group indicator. However, the interaction coefficient of 
interest, namely the coefficient on the interaction between the treatment indicator and the reform period will 
also be attenuated because only part of the indicated treatment group will actually have been treated. This 
implies that the true effects are probably even somewhat larger than the ones we estimate.  
6 
1998 as the treatment period thus ignoring 1997 (a time of ongoing lawsuits). These 
estimates were similar to our main results, so we could not find evidence for attenuation bias. 
Two years after the late 1996 reduction in sick pay, the right-wing coalition 
government between the Christian Democrats and the Liberals ended after a regular election 
installed a left-wing coalition government between the Social Democrats and the Green 
Party. As a result, on January 1, 1999, only two months after the change of government, the 
1996 sick pay reform was repealed. This introduction and then repeal of the reform within 
such a short period allows us to estimate the effects of reduced sick pay through both the 
switch-on and switch-off effects of the policy change.  
Methodologically, the question arises whether policy endogeneity or anticipation 
effects may bias our estimates. However, any transitory developments in absence from work 
or other health related outcomes that might have triggered policy reforms are taken care of by 
our difference-in-differences estimation strategy (as long as these shocks affected treatment 
and control groups similarly). Furthermore, an electronic search of a major German 
newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, for articles on sick pay revealed that a 
motivation for the reduction in sick pay were not a recent rise in absence rates, but a gradual 
realization that the German labor market regulations built up over decades had reduced labor 
market competitiveness. Furthermore, the debate on the reform only heated up after April 6
th 
1996, when the Minister of Labor proposed changes to sick pay, that is already after our pre-
reform years 1994 and 1995. The law was passed on September 13, 1996, only slightly more 
than 2 weeks before it became effective. 
 
3  Data and Descriptive Statistics 
To the best of our knowledge, the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), in 
existence since 1984, is the only person-level dataset providing information on both workers’ 
absence from work and worker coverage by collective bargaining contracts. Whereas  
7 
information on absence, asked as the number of days the worker was absent from work in the 
previous year, is collected annually, information on a worker’s coverage by a collective 
bargaining contract is only available for the 1995 survey. However, because average tenure 
in Germany is longer than in the U.K. or the U.S. (in 1998, 10.4 years versus 8.2 and 6.6 
years, respectively; Auer and Cazes, 2000), one option for the empirical strategy is to use the 
1995 information on coverage by a collective bargaining contract and impute this value for 
each individual in all other waves. Nevertheless, because an employee may alter the 
treatment status by changing employer, this procedure may blur the partition of the sample 
into treatment and control groups to produce a third source of potential attenuation bias in our 
estimates (see Section 2). We therefore restrict the sample to workers who did not change 
employer during the years under consideration (hereafter, “firm stayers”).
7 Specifically, this 
means that when defining treatment and control groups, we include only workers who 
responded to the 1995 question on collective bargaining coverage and did not change 
employer during the 1996/1997/1998 period when reduced sick pay was in place (the 
treatment period). Appendix Table A1 and Table A2 detail our selection of the estimation 
sample for this study.
8 
For the years prior to the reform, we use GSOEP data for 1994 and 1995 (days absent 
surveyed in 1995 and 1996, respectively) but exclude 1996 data because they could be partly 
affected by the October 1 implementation of the reform. In addition, 1996 was the beginning 
of the lawsuits clarifying that previous collective bargaining contracts made the reform 
                                                             
7 It should be noted that in Germany, in contrast to some other countries, employers agreeing to a collective 
bargaining contract must apply its terms to all workers in the company, not simply to workers that belong to 
the trade union negotiating the contract. Employers can avoid collective bargaining contracts, however, by 
leaving the employers’ federation. However, if employers had so changed their status, it would be yet another 
source of attenuation bias.  
8 In order to gauge whether these restrictions generate a selected sample, we regressed indicators for a) being a 
mover, b) for answering to the question on collective bargaining and on c) leaving the panel survey between 
1995 and 1997 (panel attrition is an especially important issue for the fixed-effects estimators) on days of 
absence in 1995 (before the reform) and other controls. It turns out that a) being a mover and b) answering 
the question on collective bargaining coverage is not related to pre-reform absence, whereas c) leaving the 
panel is positively correlated with days of absence. Here, for the age group 20-55, which we mainly focus on, 
  
8 
ineffective for most workers these contracts covered (see Section 2). These exclusions leave 
1997 and 1998 as the viable years for examining effects when the reduced sick pay reform 
was in place (because of the 1997 lawsuits, we also check the sensitivity of our results when 
only 1998 is considered as the treatment year). Because the reform was repealed on January 
1, 1999, GSOEP data referring to the years 1999 and 2000 provide the sample for the post-
reform period. 
Table 1 displays the sample means by reform period (pre-reform, reform, post-repeal) 
and by coverage by collective bargaining. The sample consists of workers aged between 20 
and 64 years who are not self-employed nor students or apprentices. Although the sample 
size changes across the years due to panel attrition and panel refreshment samples, it is 
lowest during the reform years because we exclude workers who changed employer during 
these years. Nevertheless, not only should the rich set of control variables contained in the 
GSOEP account for attrition based on observables, we also present fixed-effects estimates 
(see Section 4 below) that account for attrition based on unobserved variables as long as their 
effects are constant over time. 
It should be noted, however, that as the outcome variable, we only observe the total 
number of absence/sickness days in a calendar year, not the number and length of specific 
sickness spells. Moreover, although the original GSOEP question asks about workdays lost 
due to illness, the fact that we observe some people reporting sickness durations exceeding 
the number of working days indicates that the measurement of absence might be a mix of lost 
workdays and the total number of sick days (including weekends and public holidays).
9 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
increasing the days of absence by 50 days (50 days is already the 98
th percentile of days of absence) raises 
the probability of leaving the sample by 9.5 percentage points. 
9 The Ministry of Health also collects data on absence from the public health insurance system and publishes it 
on an annual basis. The average absence rates (percent of working days lost due to sickness) are 4.74, 4.79, 
5.08, and 4.75, for 1993-1996, respectively, 4.19, 4.13 for 1997 and 1998, and 4.27 and 4.22 for the years 
2000 and 2001, respectively. These absence rates, which refer to the population of workers covered by public 
health insurance (which is the vast majority), correspond to what we observe in the GSOEP data (based on 
253 working days and on all workers: 4.99, 5.06, and 4.78 percent in 1993, 1994 and 1995, respectively. 
Then during the reform these shares are 4.20 and 4.64 percent in 1997 and 1998 and after the reform 4.39 and 
  
9 
As illustrated in the upper part of Figure 1, the average number of days absent differs 
between treatment (not covered by a collective agreement) and control (covered workers) 
groups, indicating that the former generally report fewer days of absence. This finding holds 
true before, during and after the reform, except for workers under 40 following repeal (see 
the lower part of Fig. 1). Nevertheless, the raw means also suggest that the reform did have 
an effect on absence. That is, whereas the absence gap between treated and control 
observations prior to the reform was -3.4 days (8.8 days for workers without coverage and 
12.2 days for covered workers), this gap widened to -4.7 days during the reform years only to 
shrink again to -2.0 days after its repeal. The rise and fall of this gap between treated and 
control observations is even more pronounced when the analytical focus shifts to younger 
workers. As the lower part of the figure illustrates, younger workers (below 55 or 40 years of 
age) seem to have reacted more strongly to the reform. For treated workers younger than 55 
years of age, the average number of days absent decreased from 8.1 to 6.4 days during the 
reform period but rose to 9.3 days following repeal. The change in the gap between treated 
and control observations is even more pronounced, moving from -3.3 pre-treatment to -5.6 
during treatment and down to -1.4 after treatment (repeal). For workers younger than 40, 
these averages are -2.5, -4.3 and +0.9, respectively.  
Although these numbers represent raw gaps that do not take observed or unobserved 
heterogeneity into account, they nevertheless suggest that the reform did have an effect on 
workers, especially those younger than 55 years of age. Older workers, in contrast, are likely 
to be less credit constrained and may thus be less sensitive to reduced sick pay. Their absence 
may also be more strongly driven by genuine health concerns and hence less influenced by 
financial incentives. We therefore conduct an analysis of the treatment effects for all workers 
(aged 20 to 64) and then examine restricted age groups. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
4.29 percent in 1999 and 2000, respectively. So despite the slightly different populations, the GSOEP and the 
Ministry of Health data seem to indicate similar absence rates.  
10 
As Table 1 shows, treatment and control groups not only differ systematically in their 
average number of days absent but also in other characteristics. For instance, the treatment 
group earns lower hourly wages than the control group (by between 4 and 9%, depending on 
the period considered).
10 Moreover, although both groups have roughly the same average age, 
gender, civil status and health indicators, the treatment group is somewhat more educated and 
somewhat less likely to be blue collar or work part time.
11 However, the most striking 
differences between the treatment and control groups are in terms of tenure, firm size, 
industry and civil service status. That is, workers without collective bargaining coverage (the 
treatment group) have lower tenure; work in smaller firms; are much more likely to work in 
services like trade, real estate and business activities; and are generally no civil servants.
12 
These differences between the two groups persist across the observation period: there are no 
major compositional changes between the covered and uncovered groups across time. 
Nevertheless, the regression analysis reported below controls for any compositional changes 
related to observed or time-constant unobserved characteristics.  
Table 2 displays the distribution of the outcome variable, the annual number of days a 
worker was absent from work. In almost all periods, the 4th decile of the absence days’ 
distribution is 0 or 1, meaning that almost half the workers are not absent from work for a 
single day. Moreover, even though the median number of days absent is 2 in the treatment 
group and 4 or 5 among the controls, the distribution is highly skewed to the left with the 7th 
                                                             
10 Based on the assumption that reduced sick pay might lead to lower (efficiency) wages and thus might have 
both a direct effect on absence and an indirect effect through the wage rate, we estimated the effects of the 
sick pay reform on regular wages using standard difference-in-differences models with control variables and 
fixed-effect estimates. However, contrary to what efficiency wage theory might predict, all estimates of wage 
effects are insignificant, with most point estimates positive. This observation is consistent with experimental 
evidence in Dürsch, Oechsller and Vadovic (2008) who find barely any effort response by workers to sick 
pay. In our study, both these results support the interpretation that changes in the raw wage gap between 
treatment and control groups can be explained by compositional effects. 
11 Detailed information on the variables contained in the GSOEP is provided in Haisken-DeNew and Frick 
(2001). 
12 Treated observations indicating that the individual is a civil servant most probably represent classification 
error in the civil service or the collective bargaining status in the original GSOEP data. The coding error 
affects only 2 percent of the sample assigned “treatment” status. We remain conservative by keeping the data 
as they are, because if these observations were in fact controls, this classification error would generate 
attenuation bias.  
11 
decile between 6 and 12 days, the 9th decile between 20 and 30 days and the 99th percentile 
at 98 or more days. Thus, our estimation strategy must take into account the heavy censoring 
of the outcome distribution at zero.  
 
4  Effects of the Sick Pay Reform on Absence from Work 
We begin by estimating linear difference-in-differences models with the following 
specification: 
   absenceit =   + 1Xit + 2reformt + 3nocoveragei +  (reformt   nocoveragei)+  it  
  (1) 
where absence denotes the number of days of absence and reform is a dummy variable 
indicating the time period during which the reduced sick pay reform was in place (1997 and 
1998) and valued at zero pre-reform and post-repeal. Likewise, nocoverage is a dummy 
variable indicating that a worker was not covered by a collective bargaining contract (the 
treatment group). This nocoverage indicator controls for differences in absence rates between 
the treatment and control groups, which in the absence of any reform are assumed to be 
constant across time (the identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences estimator).  
Time-specific variations in absence affecting both groups similarly are controlled for 
by the reform dummy as well as further time effects.
13 The difference-in-differences 
estimator is given by  , which indicates the change in the absence differential between 
treatment and control groups after sick pay was reduced from 100 to 80%. Specification (1) 
includes no control variables. However, specifications (2)-(4) stepwise add control variables 
                                                             
13 These time effects control for macro shocks as long as these affect treatment and control groups similarly. 
Separate time effects for treatment and control groups would make the treatment effect unidentified. 
However, because treatment and control groups are distributed differently across industries, we could allow 
for industry-specific time and treatment effects and thereby allow for different effects of the macroeconomy 
on treatment and control groups. Because sample sizes shrink too much to estimate the industry-specific 
effects precisely, we have compared the average treatment effects on the treated, obtained as a weighted 
average of industry-specific treatment effects, with the main estimates reported in this paper. The differences 
in the point estimates were mostly minor.  
12 
to allow for compositional changes in the two groups across time and improve the efficiency 
of the difference-in-differences estimator as long as they can be regarded as exogenous. The 
first group of variables, included in specification (2), are the regional unemployment rate, the 
log hourly wage, age, civil status (married, children), gender and some interactions between 
them. We employ these standard controls from the absence literature because of their likely 
impact on the incidence of sickness through their effect on the benefits and costs of shirking 
through absence. Specification (3) then integrates a further set of controls by including 
education, citizenship, and job and firm characteristics, as well as a dummy for West 
Germany (see Table 1 for details). The full specification (4) adds a last set of controls that 
refer to “health at present” and “satisfaction with health” as asked in the GSOEP.  If 
respondents answer these health-related questions truthfully irrespective of their potential 
shirking behavior and if the reform had no impact on health (see Section 5), these variables 
are valid controls; otherwise, they are endogenous.  
Table 3 shows the results for the OLS difference-in-differences estimator when both 
the pre-reform and post-repeal period are simultaneously included as the reference period 
(here and in the following, we use robust standard errors clustered at the person level). 
Hence, this phase of the analysis does not distinguish between the reform’s switch-on and 
switch-off effects but rather compares the difference between the treatment and control 
groups during the reform with that before or after its repeal. This approach increases the 
sample size and hence the precision of the estimates. 
To check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the control variables just 
described (the coefficients of the control variables are reported in Table A3 in the Appendix), 
in Table 3, we report the estimated treatment effects for specification (1) through (4). In this 
table, we also report the marginal effects at the mean of the difference-in-differences 
estimates of a count-data model, which is expected to fit the data better because of the 
dependent variable’s count nature. We use the negative binomial model, NEGBIN, where the  
13 
right hand side index of equation (1) enters an exponential function to model the expected 
value of absence days; for an application in the context of absence, see Winkelmann (1999); 
technical descriptions of the NEGBIN II model that we apply here can be found in Cameron 
and Trivedi (1998, p. 70ff.) or Winkelmann (2008, p.134ff.); nonlinear difference-in-
differences models are discussed in Athey and Imbens (2006). The parameters reported here 
are the incremental effects of the treatment indicator (the interaction term) at the data mean.
14  
However, because the restriction of the sample to firm stayers may cause systematic 
attrition not only based on observed characteristics (which we control for in the OLS and 
NEGBIN estimates) but also based on unobserved characteristics, we control for unobserved 
heterogeneity by reporting (linear) fixed-effects estimates. More specifically, we identify the 
policy reform effect using only the “within individual variation”, because the fixed-effects 
estimator effectively assesses the response to the reform by considering only treated and 
control individuals observed both during the reform and in a period without reform. 
In terms of the estimate’s sensitivity to the inclusion of control variables, controlling 
for compositional changes matters mostly for the estimated standard errors (and hence the 
statistical significance of the estimates). The point estimates are rather similar across 
specifications. Therefore, below we report estimates from the full specification (4) that have 
lower standard errors. 
As regards the different modeling strategies, the differences in the point estimates 
between OLS and NEGBIN are minor, meaning that despite its theoretical deficiencies, the 
OLS model seemingly provides a very good approximation of the treatment effect at the 
mean. However, not surprisingly, most standard errors are somewhat smaller in the NEGBIN 
model, which is tailored to fit the count data. In addition, even though both the OLS and 
NEGBIN models suggest that the decrease in sick pay reduced the number of absence days 
                                                             
14 Ai and Norton (2003) derive a correct presentation of the cross derivative and cross difference in nonlinear 
models with interaction terms. However, this cross difference is not equal to the treatment effect shown in 
Puhani (2008).  
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per year by 2, this effect is only statistically significant in the NEGBIN model. Once we 
control for unobserved heterogeneity in a (linear) fixed-effects model, the point estimate 
becomes somewhat smaller (and insignificant) with an estimated reduction of 1.2 days in 
specification (4). Given that for the treated group the mean number of days absent was 8.8 
before the reform, this figure amounts to a reduction in absence of between 14 and 24 
percent, which is sizable. 
As hinted at in the previous section, based on the raw data, we might expect the effect 
of the reform to be higher among younger workers. Therefore, in Table 4, we provide the 
difference-in-differences estimates for the different age groups (here and subsequently, for 
full specification 4 with all control variables). We find that in all models, the point estimates 
become larger when older workers (aged 56–64) are excluded. More specifically, for the age 
group 20–55, the fixed-effects estimate shows a significant 2.4 reduction in days absent per 
year. For the further restricted age group 20–40, at 2.2 days, this reduction is somewhat 
smaller. We do not provide separate point estimates for older workers, because the precision 
of these estimates is too low (for the age group 56-64, the standard errors range between 4 
and 6 days, so that all estimates are statistically insignificant; the point estimates even change 
sign). Similarly, if we estimate the effects separately for men and women, the estimates 
become too imprecise to reach firm conclusions on gender differences: point estimates are 
negative for both genders and there is no clear pattern for whom the point estimates are 
larger. 
 
4.1  Effects at different points of the distribution 
The skewed nature of the distribution of absence days, with a high probability mass at 
zero, raises the question of whether the reform had a larger effect on longer or on shorter 
durations of absence. To answer this question, we describe the reform’s effect at different 
parts of the distribution by difference-in-differences quantile regressions (for a technical  
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description see Athey and Imbens, 2006, p. 446f.; another application is Song and 
Manchester, 2007; Koenker, 2005, Chapter 2, provides a general introduction to quantile 
regression). Quantile regression difference-in-differences implies stronger identifying 
assumptions than does OLS because we must assume that the differences in the distributions 
(not simply the differences in the means) between treatment and control groups would have 
remained constant in the absence of reform. Hence, in Table 5, we show difference-in-
differences quantile estimates by decile, again for the three age groups sampled. 
Theoretically, the OLS estimate is the mean of the coefficients at all quantiles; however, as 
the results show, up to the 4th decile, the effect is (virtually) zero. This finding is not 
surprising given that around 40% of all workers in the sample report not having been absent 
for a single day. The point estimates of the reform’s effect on days absent then grow ever 
more negative with increasing deciles. For all workers (i.e., aged 20–64), by the 9th decile, 
the point estimate is a statistically significant 4.8 days reduction in absence.
15 It should also 
be noted that the 9th decile of the number of days absent for the treatment group is 23, which 
corresponds to a sizable reduction in absence of more than 20%. In other words, the quantile 
regressions reveal that it is mainly absence durations of several weeks (cumulated over the 
year) that are reduced by the reform. 
Once the sample is restricted to workers aged 20–55 or 20–40, we obtain statistical 
significance from the 7th decile onwards, with 7th decile estimates of -0.8 in both cases. 
Given that the 7th decile of absence days in the treatment group before the reform was 8 
days, this figure constitutes a reduction of almost one tenth. The reduction becomes larger at 
higher deciles (both absolutely and relatively) for the group aged 20–55. In the 20–40 age 
group, the point estimates at the very high quantiles (95th and 98th) are the largest of all 
                                                             
15 The displayed quantile regression estimates, obtained using the econometric software package Stata 10, take 
sampling weights into account.  Standard errors reported for the quantile regressions do not allow for 
clustering; however, we find that block-bootstrapped standard errors that do take clustering into account 
differ little from the asymptotic standard errors ignoring clustering in an unweighted regression.   
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quantiles but are statistically insignificant because of the large standard errors associated with 
the sensitivity to outliers of quantile regressions for extreme quantiles of the distribution.  
In results not shown here both OLS and probit estimates cannot detect any effect of 
the reform on the incidence of absence (i.e. a binary indicator of whether a person has been 
absent for at least one day or not). This is in line with the quantile regression estimates which 
do not find any effect near the median of the days of absence distribution.  
 
4.2  Switch-on and switch-off effects 
Because our dataset includes information on absence before and during the reform 
and after its repeal, we can estimate the effect of the reduction in sick pay (switch on) 
separately from the subsequent repeal and increase in sick pay (switch off). Doing so has two 
advantages. First, the difference-in-differences approach used here relies on the identifying 
assumption that in the counterfactual absence of the reform, the gap in absence days between 
treatment and control groups would have remained constant. One reason for violating this 
assumption would be another incident or reform of which the researcher is unaware that 
might have had a differential impact on absence days for both groups. To dissipate such 
doubts, research designs that introduce and subsequently take back a reform are very helpful. 
If both effects have similar values and both indicate that absence is lower with lower sick 
pay, we can have more confidence that the effects estimated are genuinely caused by the sick 
pay reform.  
In fact, the above-mentioned estimates do not distinguish between the pre-reform and 
post-repeal periods, which implies that the introduction of the reform has the same impact on 
absence (in absolute terms) as its repeal. To check this assumption, we estimate the effects of 
the reform’s implementation (switch on) and repeal (switch off) separately. Table 6 presents 
the switch-on and switch-off estimates separately by age group based on data for the years 
1994, 1995, 1997 and 1998 for the switch-on effects and for the years 1997, 1998, 1999 and  
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2000 for the switch-off effects. Table 7 then reports the corresponding quantile regression 
estimates. The models are specified so that a negative estimate always implies that, as 
expected, absence is lower during the period of reduced sick pay.  
In Table 6, all switch-on and switch-off point estimates are negative in absolute value. 
In the NEGBIN model, all coefficients are statistically significantly different from zero. 
Hence, we argue that the reform had a genuine effect on days absent. Interestingly, however, 
when we compare the absolute size of the switch-on and switch-off effects in Table 6, we 
find that in all cases (except for the age group 20-64 in the fixed-effects estimates) the 
switch-off point estimates are larger than the switch-on effects (this holds at virtually all 
quantiles, as shown in Table 7). However, this difference is only statistically significant in 
OLS specifications that neither take into account the count data nature of the outcome 
variable nor unobserved heterogeneity. In the NEGBIN model the point estimate is an 
insignificant 0.44 days larger for the switch-off effect compared to the switch-on effect, but 
this difference amounts only to insignificant 0.14 days in the fixed-effects model for workers 
aged 20-55. Because these differences are not statistically significant, one choice would be to 
ignore them; however, the difference becomes larger – albeit insignificant – for the 20–40 
age group at 1.47 days (marginally insignificant at the 10 percent level) in the NEGBIN, and 
at 1.37 (insignificant) in the fixed-effects model. 
One possible basis for interpreting these larger switch-off point estimates is the 
experimental and psychological literature on extrinsic versus intrinsic motivation. According 
to Pinder (2008, p. 81), intrinsic motivation, roughly defined, relates to “behavior that is 
performed for its own sake rather than for the purpose of acquiring any material or social 
rewards”. The fact that the switch-off effects are larger than the switch-on effects is 
congruent with experimental evidence from Gächter, Kessler and Königstein (2007) that 
incentive contracts negatively impact voluntary cooperation among individuals, and that 
these negative effects persist even after the incentive contract is repealed. It also relates to an  
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ongoing debate in the psychological literature on whether extrinsic motivation may crowd out 
intrinsic motivation (Pinder, 2008, p. 86ff.). That is, because sick pay before the reform was 
100%, showing up for work in Germany had an aspect of voluntary cooperation, at least for 
workers not seeking promotion, and such voluntary cooperation can be linked to intrinsic 
motivation. Reduced sick pay then added an element of immediate extrinsic motivation that 
was abolished after the reform was repealed. Hence, in light of Gächter, Kessler and 
Königstein’s (2007) findings, the experience of extrinsic motivation may have crowded out 
some intrinsic motivation even after repeal. Nevertheless, the extrinsic motivation of reduced 
sick pay during the reform period was effective in reducing absence, which supports the 
economist’s paradigm that people react to incentives. 
 
4.3  Placebo estimates and estimates by calendar year 
Because we have two years of observations for each “regime” (pre-reform, reform, 
after repeal), we can in theory test the identifying assumption of the difference-in-differences 
estimator by, for example, testing whether a “placebo treatment effect” estimate for the year 
1995 (pre-reform) with 1994 as the base year (also pre-reform) is equal to zero. In Table 8, 
we therefore define 1994 as the base year and estimate “treatment effects” for all further 
years used in the previous estimates: 1995 (pre-reform), 1997, 1998 (both reform) and 1999, 
2000 (both post-repeal). If the difference-in-differences identifying assumption is correct, 
only the grey-shaded coefficients (reform period) should be different from zero.  
Table 8 shows that standard errors become very large when estimating treatment 
effects by calendar year (most standard errors are between 1 and 2 days, some are even 
larger), so that hardly any coefficient is statistically significant. Still, larger negative 
coefficients are (with few exceptions) observed mainly during the reform period. After the 
repeal of the reform, some point estimates turn quite large and positive, especially for the 
year 2000 (two of them even significant), but the standard errors are large as well. We cannot  
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determine whether this finding is due to crowding out of intrinsic motivation as mentioned in 
the previous subsection or due to a violation of the identifying assumption. In general, we 
observe a clear decrease in absence with the onset of the reform period and a subsequent 
increase after the repeal of the reform. This holds both across the defined age group samples 
and across estimation methods (OLS, NEGBIN, and linear fixed-effects). 
 
5  Effects of the Sick Pay Reform on Other Health-Related Outcomes 
Although reduced sick pay decreased absence from work, it remains unclear whether 
this means that the reform was beneficial from a welfare perspective. In this section, we show 
that the reform surprisingly even reduced the average number of days spent in hospital. This 
suggests that at least part of the absence reduced by the reform was genuinely health related. 
However, we also show that the reform was not associated with a significant reduction in 
indicators of subjective health or long-term sickness. Taken together, the reform might have 
reduced inefficient use of the health care system. 
According to the OECD, in 1995, just before the sick pay reform, health expenditure 
in Germany as a percentage of the GDP was 10.1%, higher than in the U.K. (6.9%) but lower 
than in the U.S. (13.3%). Life expectancy at birth, however, was rather similar in these three 
countries (between 75.7 and 76.7 years). The number of doctor visits per year was highest in 
Germany (6.4), followed by the U.K. (6.1) and the U.S. (3.3); by 2003, these gaps had 
become even larger, at 7.6, 5.2 and 3.9, respectively. The average number of hospital stays 
per person was 0.18, 0.21 and 0.12 and the average length of stay for acute care was 11.4, 7.1 
and 6.5 days for Germany, the U.K. and the U.S., with Germany having by far the longest 
average duration of acute care stays. Hence, contacts with the medical system are seemingly 
more frequent and longer in Germany. Because these OECD figures (for the whole 
population) correspond roughly to the sample means in the GSOEP (for a sample of workers 
aged 20–64), we consider three further outcome variables: the number of doctor visits in the  
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last 3 months (asked in the GSOEP), number of days in hospital (including zeros) and 
number of hospital stays (see Table 9 for the sample distributions). We then go on to 
investigate the reform’s effects on two subjective health indicators and an indicator for long-
term sickness before we conclude by investigating the reform’s effects on satisfaction with 
financial security in case of sickness.  
 
5.1  Effects on usage of the health care system 
In Table 10, we report difference-in-differences estimates for the three outcomes 
concerning usage of the health care system by age group. Not only are all point estimates 
negative, but those for number of days in hospital and number of hospital stays are all 
statistically significant. Moreover, the fixed-effects estimates for these two variables are 
similar to the OLS results, implying that the OLS findings are not driven by unobserved 
heterogeneity. Because of the extreme extent of censoring of the hospital visit outcome 
variables, we place special emphasis on the NEGBIN estimates. The NEGBIN point 
estimates are somewhat smaller in absolute value; however, they still remain economically 
and statistically significant. For the 20–64 age group, compared to a pre-reform treatment 
group average of 1.35, the reform reduced the average number of days in hospital by 0.41 
days (almost one third, 30%) on average. Given that it also reduced the number of stays by an 
estimated 0.045 (41%) at least part of the reduction in the number of days hospitalized is 
explained by the actual elimination of some hospital stays. Although these estimates may 
seem large, they can be made plausible by doctors’ incentives given the low occupancy rates 
of hospital beds: these ranged between only 76 and 82% in Germany in the period 1996 





5.2  Effects on health indicators  
Given the reform’s effects on absence from work and hospital stays, we ask whether 
the estimated reductions had a detrimental effect on health. Hence we use the two subjective 
health indicators asked in the GSOEP (Health At Present and Satisfaction With Health) as 
outcome variables. Subjective health measures have been critically discussed in the literature. 
On the one hand, economists usually postulate that each person should be the best judge of 
his or her utility and this may also be true for health (Dolan, 2000, p. 1732). In a literature 
survey, Idler and Benyamini (1997) find that “global self-rated health is an independent 
predictor of mortality in nearly all of the studies, despite the inclusion of numerous specific 
health status indicators” (p. 21). On the other hand, inter-person comparisons of self-rated 
health seem to be plagued by people’s adaptation to changing states of health as well as 
changing reference groups over the life cycle and with changing health (Groot, 2000).  
In addition to subjective health, we check whether the reform had an impact on the 
incidence of continuous sickness spells lasting for at least six weeks. This is the only 
indicator in the GSOEP that we could find as an objective proxy for serious illness. The 
subjective health measures are recorded on Likert scales and have been normed to range 
between 0 and 1. Control variables are the same as in specification (3) of Table 3. We report 
OLS and fixed-effects estimates, for the whole sampling period and separately for switch-on 
and switch-off effects. The reform’s effects on the subjective health indicators are presented 
in Table 11.
16  
In the table, most of the estimates are statistically insignificant. For Health At Present, 
two of the switch-off fixed effects estimates are negative and statistically significant at the 10 
percent level. However, neither the corresponding estimates for Satisfaction With Health nor 
                                                             
16 We use the same sample as for the estimation of the reform’s effects on absence. Hence, in order to be in the 
sample, a person has to have valid responses in the current and in the consecutive year. The reason is that the 
information on absence is obtained from retrospective information in the following year’s GSOEP 
questionnaire. Our sample definitions guarantee that the estimates of absence and health effects refer to the 
same population.  
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the corresponding switch-on estimates are statistically significant. For Satisfaction With 
Health as the outcome, three of the nine OLS estimates are statistically significant and 
negative, but none of the fixed-effects estimates is statistically significant. Hence, from these 
estimates, there is no convincing evidence that the sick pay reform had a negative effect on 
subjective health.  
Nevertheless, health may be deteriorating over time: in Table 11, we have considered 
subjective health in the current year (1997 and 1998 for the reform years). In Table 12 we 
investigate whether the reform had an impact on subjective health a year later (so the 
outcomes for the reform years are measured in 1998 and 1999; for the control years, we also 
lag the outcomes by one year accordingly). As the table shows, all point estimates are close 
to zero and none of them is statistically significant. Hence, when considering subjective 
health indicators for all employees, either in the current or in the following year, there is no 
robust evidence for the reform to have had any significantly negative effects.  
Because the population of employees consists of a lot of people who have not been 
sick during the entire year, we narrow down the population of interest in the following: first, 
we consider the reform’s effects on subjective health only on employees who state to have 
visited the doctor at least once during the previous three months (i.e. people who experienced 
some sort of sickness). Second, we restrict the sample further by considering only employees 
who have been in hospital during the current year. We then estimate the reform’s effects on 
subjective health for these subpopulations. Again, we distinguish between the effects on 
subjective health in the current year and between effects on subjective health in the 
subsequent year to capture any potentially protracted effects. The results for workers who 
have been to the doctor are presented in Table 13 and Table 14 and those for workers who 
have been to hospital in Table 15 and Table 16, respectively. As can be seen from Table 13 
and Table 14, there is no convincing indication that the sick pay reform decreased subjective 
health outcomes either in the current or in the following year. There is one negative and  
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statistically significant (at the 10 percent level) coefficient in the fixed effects model: the 
switch-off effect for the age group 20-40 in the estimate for Health At Present. However, the 
corresponding estimate for Satisfaction With Health is statistically insignificant. The two 
OLS estimates which are negative and statistically significant at the 10 percent level in 
Table 13 are close to zero and statistically insignificant when a fixed-effects model is 
estimated. The one statistically significant fixed-effects estimate in Table 14 (effect on 
Health At Present in the following year) is positive instead of negative and insignificant in 
the corresponding estimate for Satisfaction With Health as the outcome. When we restrict the 
sample to workers who have been in hospital (see Table 15 and Table 16), there are again no 
statistically significant negative effects on subjective health.
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To investigate at least a proxy for an objective health outcome in the GSOEP, we use 
the question on a continuous sickness spell of 6 weeks or longer. The way this question will 
be understood by most Germans is referring to being sick as declared by a physician, because 
for sickness spells longer than 2 days, employees have to provide a doctor’s certificate. Note 
that although we have already shown in the previous section that the reform predominantly 
reduced longer durations of absence, as demonstrated by the quantile regression estimates, 
longer duration there meant longer days of absence accumulated over a calendar year, that is, 
a long duration of absence might be an accumulation of many shorter spells. Here, we look at 
a continuous sickness spell of at least 6 weeks. As Table 17 shows, the sick pay reform seems 
to have decreased, not increased the incidence of long and continuous sickness spells. The 
estimates indicate a 2 to 3 percentage point reduction in long-term sickness due to the reform 
and they are statistically significant. One explanation for the reduced incidence of long-term 
                                                             
17 Note that in these estimates, the number of observations who are treated during the reform years is reduced to 
only 22 to 63 workers (depending on the age group considered). This may explain why there is a positive and 
fairly large estimate of the reform for the age group 20-40 in Table 17. We report no fixed-effects estimates 
for this age group, because we would only have 10 persons in the treatment group during the treatment period 
with a within variation in the treatment status that is needed to identify the fixed-effects estimate. For the age 
group 20-64, inference in the fixed effects estimates is also plagued by the low number of persons with a 
within variation in the treatment indicator, which is 26 in this case.  
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sickness may again be the incentive effects provided by the reform that seem to have 
dominated any potentially negative effects on health. To investigate the possibility of 
negative health effects further, we check whether the incidence of long continuous sickness 
spells was increased with a delay of one year: these estimates are provided in the lower panel 
of Table 17. Only one of the estimates is statistically significant using OLS (again suggestion 
a reduction in long-term sickness), whereas the corresponding fixed-effects estimate is 
virtually zero and statistically insignificant. All other point estimates are also close to zero 
and statistically insignificant.  
Hence, we conclude that there is no convincing evidence that the sick pay reform 
impaired health outcomes, despite of the fact that it reduced stays in hospital. 
 
5.3  Effects on the perception of liquidity constraints in case of sickness 
As a last check, we estimate whether the reform changed the employee’s “satisfaction 
with their financial security in the case of sickness”. Again, this question was asked on a 
Likert scale in the GSOEP, which we normalize between 0 (very bad) and 1 (very good). 
During our observation period, this question was only asked in 1997 and 2002, so that we 
only provide switch-off estimates. The results are presented in Table 18. For all workers and 
for the restricted sample of workers who have visited the doctor in the last three months at 
least once, none of the point estimates is statistically significant and all point estimates are 
small. If we restrict the sample further to workers who have been to hospital in the current 
year, the number of treated persons in the treatment period becomes very small: there are 
only 59, 49, and 22 such persons for the OLS estimates and only 3, 3, and 1 person with a 
within variation in the treatment indicator for the age groups 20-64, 20-55 and 20-40, 
respectively, so that we do not report fixed-effects estimates. We are also cautions in 
interpreting the estimates based on 59, 49, and 22 treated persons in the sample of people 
who have been to hospital for the age groups 20-64, 20-55 and 20-40, respectively, and  
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conclude that at least from the sample of people who have been to the doctor as well as for all 
workers, we cannot find any evidence for negative effects of the reform on the satisfaction 
with financial security in case of sickness. 
 
6  Conclusions 
The economic costs of absence from work can be influenced by economic policy. For 
example, in contrast to the cases of Switzerland, the U.K. or the U.S., German federal law (as 
well as statutes in other continental European countries) dictates that employees receive 
100% of their wages as sick pay from day 1 of their absence spell. However, whereas the 
literature to date does suggest that such absence is influenced by economic incentives like 
wages, local unemployment, probationary periods or sick pay, few studies estimate the 
effects of sick pay on absence by way of natural experiments. Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, ours is the first study to analyze health-related outcomes of sick pay reform and 
also the first to estimate both the switch-on and switch-off effects; that is, the effects of the 
reform’s implementation and its subsequent repeal by a changed federal government.  
The basis of our empirical strategy is a difference-in-differences approach that 
controls for time and group effects. In some specifications, we also control for unobserved 
individual heterogeneity by explicitly using the panel nature of the data in a fixed-effects 
estimation. Overall, we estimate that the reduction in sick pay from 100% of the wage to 80% 
decreased absence days by about 2 days per annum on average, which is equal to about one 
percent of annual working days in Germany (about half the difference between U.S. and 
German absence rates). As our quantile regressions find, this reduction is primarily driven by 
a shortening of very long spells. These results are confirmed by separate estimates for switch-
on and switch-off effects. Our finding is significant in that if labor contributes two-thirds of 
the GDP, then the ceteris paribus effect of the reform amounts to an increase in the GDP of 
about two thirds of a percent through the reduction of absence from work alone.  
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Besides reducing absence from work, decreased sick pay also reduces reliance on the 
health care system, which in Germany has almost zero marginal cost to most individuals (the 
system is mostly public). We find that the reduction in absence due to the reform (by about 2 
days) also reduces the average number of days spent in hospital (by not quite half a day, a 
reduction of 30%). Data from the German Hospital Society (Deutsche Krankenhaus 
Gesellschaft) report hospital costs as a percent of GDP at a fairly steady 2.4%. This would 
imply that the sick pay reform had saved 0.72% of GDP through hospital costs alone, and in 
addition to the two thirds of GDP saved for employers. In sum, the reform might have saved 
up to 1.38% of GDP. Although costs saved might be lower if the reduction in absence and 
hospital stays referred to less than average productivity days at work and less than average 
costs per day in hospital, even half a percent of GDP saved would be sizable. The policy 
relevance of these results is reinforced by the fact that we did not find any remarkable effects 
of the reform on subjective health indicators nor on long-term sickness, indicating that the 
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Table 1  
Sample means by year and treatment status 
   Treated  Control 
   1994/95  1997/98  1999/00  1994/95  1997/98  1999/00 
Days absent  8.8  8.0  9.7  12.2  12.7  11.7 
Hourly wage  2.47  2.65  2.65  2.56  2.69  2.70 
Regional unemployment rate  10.6  12.6  11.3  10.4  12.4  11.3 
Civil status indicators             
Age  38.8  42.9  41.6  40.5  43.5  42.7 
Married  0.60  0.64  0.57  0.63  0.68  0.65 
Female  0.44  0.45  0.48  0.42  0.42  0.41 
Children younger than 16  0.38  0.35  0.35  0.37  0.35  0.34 
Female   children younger than 16  0.15  0.16  0.16  0.14  0.12  0.11 
Female   married  0.25  0.28  0.26  0.25  0.27  0.26 
Educational attainment             
Higher education - University degree  0.13  0.14  0.20  0.12  0.12  0.15 
Higher education - no degree  0.21  0.19  0.22  0.24  0.26  0.26 
 Apprenticeship  0.53  0.54  0.48  0.48  0.48  0.46 
No apprenticeship  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.15  0.15  0.13 
Job and firm characteristics             
Temporary work contract  0.04  0.02  0.06  0.06  0.03  0.05 
Working fulltime  0.80  0.81  0.79  0.85  0.86  0.85 
Blue-collar worker  0.32  0.26  0.28  0.38  0.37  0.35 
White-collar worker  0.67  0.72  0.70  0.50  0.51  0.54 
Civil servant  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.12  0.12  0.11 
Citizenship/region             
German  0.92  0.93  0.94  0.92  0.91  0.91 
West Germany  0.77  0.79  0.80  0.82  0.82  0.82 
Firm size             
Firm size (1–19)  0.41  0.40  0.34  0.14  0.12  0.14 
Firm size (20–199)  0.32  0.35  0.31  0.28  0.29  0.28 
Firm size (200–1,999)  0.15  0.14  0.19  0.26  0.27  0.27 
Firm size (>2,000)  0.12  0.11  0.15  0.32  0.32  0.30 
Tenure             
Tenure (<1 year)  0.06  0.00  0.17  0.03  0.00  0.08 
Tenure (1–3 years)  0.31  0.06  0.20  0.16  0.04  0.09 
Tenure (3–5 years)  0.18  0.20  0.11  0.14  0.11  0.08 
Tenure (5–10 years)  0.19  0.37  0.25  0.21  0.31  0.25 
Tenure (10–15 years)  0.07  0.13  0.11  0.12  0.12  0.14 
Tenure (15–20 years)  0.06  0.06  0.06  0.11  0.13  0.12 
Tenure (>20 years)  0.12  0.18  0.11  0.23  0.29  0.24 
Industry             
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.01 
Mining and quarrying  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.00 
Manufacturing  0.29  0.32  0.28  0.29  0.31  0.30 
Electricity, gas and water supply  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Construction  0.10  0.08  0.06  0.08  0.06  0.06 
Wholesale and retail trade  0.24  0.21  0.23  0.11  0.09  0.10 
Transport and communication  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.07  0.06  0.05 
Financial intermediation  0.03  0.04  0.05  0.04  0.05  0.05 
Real estate and business activities  0.14  0.18  0.19  0.03  0.02  0.04 
Public administration and defense  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.14  0.15  0.15 
Education  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.07  0.08  0.06  
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Table 1 (continued) 
Sample means by year and treatment status 
   Treated  Control 
   1994/95  1997/98  1999/00  1994/95  1997/98  1999/00 
Industry             
Health and social work  0.06  0.05  0.07  0.11  0.11  0.12 
Other social and personal service   0.04  0.04  0.03  0.03  0.04  0.04 
Satisfaction with health             
Very poor  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 Poor  0.06  0.09  0.09  0.07  0.06  0.07 
Satisfactory  0.27  0.31  0.26  0.28  0.30  0.30 
Good  0.45  0.45  0.48  0.44  0.47  0.45 
Very good  0.21  0.14  0.17  0.20  0.16  0.17 
Health at present             
Very poor  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01  0.01 
 Poor  0.10  0.13  0.12  0.11  0.10  0.11 
Satisfactory  0.32  0.34  0.32  0.31  0.34  0.36 
Good  0.49  0.44  0.45  0.47  0.47  0.45 
Very good  0.08  0.08  0.10  0.10  0.08  0.07 
n  2,227  1,056  1,620  8,024  5,044  5,731 






Table 2  
Percentiles of absence days by period and treatment status 
1994 / 1995   1997 / 1998   1999 / 2000 
   (Pre-reform)  (Treatment Period)  (Repeal) 
  Treated  Control  Treated  Control  Treated  Control 
Percentile 












30  0  0  0  0  0  0 
40  0  1  0  0  0  1 
50  2  5  2  4  2  4 
60  5  8  4  7  5  6 
70  8  12  6  10  8  10 
80  14  16  10  15  12  15 
90  23  30  20  30  21  28 
95  40  49  30  50  36  44 
96  42  60  30  60  42  53 
97  51  65  40  75  52  64 
98  65  90  50  110  80  90 
99  105  125  98  165  117  124 
100  210  365  365  365  365  365 
Mean  8.8  12.2  8.0  12.7  9.7  11.7 
n  2,227  8,024  1,056  5,044  1,620  5,731 




Table 3  
Difference-in-differences estimates 
   OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
       
Specification (1)  -1.82  -1.97  -1.19 
(s.e.)  (1.44)  (1.50)  (1.27) 
       
Specification (2)  -1.92  -2.07  -1.18 
(s.e.)  (1.42)  (1.28)  (1.25) 
       
Specification (3)  -1.74  -1.94*  -1.28 
(s.e.)  (1.37)  (1.11)  (1.24) 
       
Specification (4)  -1.99  -2.07**  -1.24 
(s.e.)  (1.33)  (0.91)  (1.22) 
n  23,702  23,702  23,702 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The specifications 
are distinguished by the set of control variables: specification (1) includes no controls; specification 
(2) adds state unemployment, log hourly wage, civil status indicators, gender and some interaction 
terms to account for compositional changes: specification (3) adds education, citizenship, job and firm 
characteristics, and a dummy for West Germany; specification (4) extends the set of control variables 
by adding reported health status and satisfaction with health. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations. 
 
 
Table 4  
Difference-in-differences estimates for restricted age groups 
   OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
       
Age 20-64  -1.99  -2.07**  -1.24 
n=23,702  (1.33)  (0.91)  (1.22) 
       
Age 20-55  -2.85**  -2.30***  -2.35** 
n=21,451  (1.24)  (0.83)  (1.10) 
       
Age 20-40  -2.56**  -2.04***  -2.24** 
n=12,097  (1.14)  (0.75)  (0.98) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 




Table 5  
Difference-in-differences quantile regression estimates 
Percentile 
























             
40  0.02  0  -0.07  0  -0.04  0 
  (0.21)    (0.14)    (0.15)   
             
50  -0.20  2  -0.39  2  0.01  3 
  (0.32)    (0.29)    (0.59)   
             
60  -0.28  5  -0.28  5  -0.71  5 
  (0.45)    (0.53)    (0.72)   
             
70  -0.79  8  -0.77*  8  -0.76**  8 
  (0.56)    (0.45)    (0.36)   
             
80  -1.33  14  -1.32**  14  -1.18***  14 
  (0.99)    (0.58)    (0.36)   
             
90  -4.83**  23  -4.85***  21  -3.94**  20 
  (2.05)    (1.69)    (1.53)   
             
95  -9.30***  40  -7.66***  35  -4.01  30 
  (2.86)    (2.06)    (2.52)   
             
98  -10.49*  65  -15.84**  60  -7.31  50 
  (6.04)    (6.30)    (6.49)   
             
OLS  -1.99  -  -2.85**  -  -2.56**  - 
  (1.33)    (1.24)    (1.14)   
                    
n  23,702     21,451     12,097    
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Percentiles of 30 
and lower are zero because more than 30% of the sample did not report a single day of absence. 
“pre-treatment percentile of treatment group“ refers to the corresponding percentile of the treatment 
group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 





Table 6  
Switch-on versus switch-off difference-in-differences estimates 
   Age 20-64  Age 20-55  Age 20-40 
   Switch-on  Switch-off  Switch-on  Switch-off  Switch-on  Switch-off 
             
OLS  -1.39  -3.04**  -1.97  -4.46***  -1.35  -5.49*** 
  (1.43)  (1.53)  (1.29)  (1.52)  (1.11)  (1.86) 
             
Difference (off-
on)  1.65  2.49*  4.14** 
(p-value)  (0.23)  (0.07)  (0.02) 
n  16,351  13,451  14,865  11,959  8,552  6,338 
             
NEGBIN  -2.03**  -2.05**  -2.19**  -2.63***  -1.55*  -3.02*** 
  (1.03)  (0.91)  (0.93)  (0.80)  (0.84)  (0.84) 
             
Difference (off-
on)  0.02  0.44  1.47 
(p-value)  (0.95)  (0.54)  (0.10) 
n  16,351  13,451  14,865  11,959  8,552  6,338 
             
FE  -1.39  -1.05  -2.29*  -2.43*  -1.66  -3.03* 
  (1.45)  (1.39)  (1.34)  (1.33)  (1.29)  (1.55) 
       
Difference (off-
on)  -0.34  0.14  1.37 
(p-value)  (0.82)  (0.93)  (0.50) 
n  23,702  21,451  12,097 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The fixed-effects 
switch-on and switch-off estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.   
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Table 7  
Switch-on versus switch-off quantile regression difference-in-differences estimates  
   Aged 20–64  Aged 20–55  Aged 20–40 
Percentile  Switch-on  Switch-off  Switch-on  Switch-off  Switch-on  Switch-off 
             
40  0.31  -0.05  -0.00  -0.28  0.27  -0.67*** 
  (0.17)  (0.22)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.23)  (0.01) 
             
50  0.10  -0.65**  -0.20  -0.88***  0.41**  -1.49*** 
  (0.28)  (0.29)  (0.55)  (0.28)  (0.20)  (0.37) 
             
60  0.25  -0.93**  0.08  -1.10**  -0.32  -2.42*** 
  (0.29)  (0.39)  (0.56)  (0.51)  (0.61)  (0.21) 
             
70  -0.49  -1.57***  -0.51  -1.68***  -0.18  -2.30*** 
  (0.45)  (0.38)  (0.45)  (0.46)  (0.37)  (0.49) 
             
80  -0.94  -2.81***  -1.19  -2.19***  0.10  -3.44*** 
  (0.84)  (0.72)  (0.85)  (0.38)  (0.63)  (0.31) 
             
90  -3.86**  -4.33**  -3.94**  -5.31***  -2.05*  -7.71*** 
  (1.95)  (1.75)  (1.90)  (1.29)  (1.08)  (1.94) 
             
95  -7.74***  -10.16***  -7.28**  -10.75***  -4.37  -8.72*** 
  (2.65)  (2.56)  (3.05)  (1.84)  (3.34)  (2.85) 
             
98  -10.68  -8.20  -9.62*  -13.05*  -2.80  -12.63*** 
  (8.66)  (6.34)  (10.91)  (6.88)  (10.44)  (4.77) 
             
OLS  -1.39  -3.04**  -1.97  -4.46***  -1.35  -5.49*** 
  (1.43)  (1.53)  (1.29)  (1.52)  (1.11)  (1.86) 
                    
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Percentiles of 30 
and lower are zero because more than 30% of the sample did not report a single day of absence. 
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Table 8  
“Treatment effects” by calendar year (base year 1994) – including placebo estimates  
   OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
Age 20-64       
1995 * no coll. agr.  -1.20  1.84  -0.91 
  (1.50)  (1.60)  (1.33) 
       
1997 * no coll. agr.  -1.94  -1.69  -2.17 
  (1.81)  (1.13)  (1.53) 
       
1998 * no coll. agr.  -2.45  -0.63  -1.52 
  (2.29)  (1.80)  (2.28) 
       
1999 * no coll. agr.  0.90  0.77  -0.32 
  (1.68)  (1.39)  (1.54) 
       
2000 * no coll. agr.  0.46  1.66  -1.42 
   (2.63)  (1.71)  (2.34) 
       
Age 20-55       
1995 * no coll. agr.  -0.31  2.48  -1.12 
  (1.30)  (1.58)  (1.35) 
       
1997 * no coll. agr.  -1.95  -1.27  -2.94* 
  (1.60)  (1.06)  (1.51) 
       
1998 * no coll. agr.  -2.76  -0.91  -2.90** 
  (1.79)  (1.58)  (1.80) 
       
1999 * no coll. agr.  1.54  1.28  -0.76 
  (1.48)  (1.36)  (1.51) 
       
2000 * no coll. agr.  2.85  3.45*  -0.21 
   (2.71)  (1.89)  (2.51) 
       
Age 20-40       
1995 * no coll. agr.  -0.68  1.49  -2.11 
  (1.41)  (1.13)  (1.69) 
       
1997 * no coll. agr.  -2.01  -1.12  -3.15* 
  (1.53)  (1.09)  (1.61) 
       
1998 * no coll. agr.  -1.58  -0.7  -2.60 
  (1.58)  (1.33)  (1.72) 
       
1999 * no coll. agr.  1.20  1.62  -1.76 
  (1.57)  (1.62)  (1.88) 
       
2000 * no coll. agr.  6.77  5.18**  2.37 
   (4.57)  (2.60)  (4.05) 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
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Table 9  
Percentiles of other health-related outcomes 
  
Doctor visits  
(last 3 months) 
Days in  
hospital 
Number of  
hospital stays 
30  0  0  0 
40  1  0  0 
50  1  0  0 
60  2  0  0 
70  2  0  0 
80  3  0  0 
90  6  0  0 
95  10  7  1 
96  10  10  1 
97  10  12  1 
98  12  15  1 
99  17  24  2 
100  90  220  20 
Mean  2.41  1.16  0.12 
n  23,701  23,680  23,612 




Table 10  
Effects on other health-related outcomes 
   OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
Pre-reform 
mean  
Age 20–64    (n=23,702)         
Doctor visits (last 3 months)  -0.26  -0.21  0.03  2.2 
  (0.18)  (0.15)  (0.15)   
         
Days in hospital  -0.65**  -0.41***  -0.62*  1.35 
  (0.30)  (0.11)  (0.32)   
         
Number of hospital stays  -0.061***  -0.045***  -0.065**  0.111 
  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.028)   
         
Age 20–55    (n=21,451)             
Doctor visits (last 3 months)  -0.25  -0.23  -0.01  2.21 
  (0.19)  (0.16)  (0.16)   
         
Days in hospital  -0.67**  -0.37***  -0.73**  1.12 
  (0.28)  (0.10)  (0.34)   
         
Number of hospital stays  -0.068***  -0.046***  -0.065**  0.108 
  (0.024)  (0.012)  (0.031)   
              
Age 20–40    (n=12,097)             
Doctor visits (last 3 months)  -0.42*  -0.34**  -0.26  1.91 
  (0.22)  (0.17)  (0.19)   
         
Days in hospital  -0.53**  -0.25*  -0.68**  0.65 
  (0.23)  (0.15)  (0.29)   
         
Number of hospital stays  -0.079***  -0.050***  -0.085*  0.084 
  (0.031)  (0.012)  (0.047)   
              
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The “pre-reform 
mean“ refers to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 




Table 11  
Effects on subjective health indicators (full sample) 
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






Health at present   
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.008  -0.000  -0.022  -0.007  0.003  -0.021*  0.63 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)   
               
n  23,702  16,351  13,451  23,702  23,702   
               
Age 20-55  -0.011  -0.005  -0.024  -0.006  0.005  -0.020  0.63 
  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)   
               
n  21,451  14,865  11,959  21,451  21,451   
               
Age 20-40  0.003  0.018  -0.034  -0.002  0.020  -0.031*  0.66 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.018)   
               
n  12,097  8,552  6,338  12,097  12,097   
               
Satisfaction with health   
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.021*  -0.019  -0.025**  -0.011  -0.008  -0.015  0.69 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)   
               
n  23,702  16,351  13,451  23,702  23,702   
               
Age 20-55  -0.019  -0.018  -0.023*  -0.005  -0.002  -0.010  0.70 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)   
               
n  21,451  14,865  11,959  21,451  21,451   
               
Age 20-40  -0.009  -0.005  -0.023  -0.009  -0.006  -0.012  0.71 
  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.013)   
               
n  12,097  8,552  6,338  12,097  12,097   
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off estimates 
are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The “pre-reform mean“ refers to the 
treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.   
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Table 12  
Effects on subjective health indicators in the following year (full sample) 
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






Health at present (next year) 
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  0.008  0.004  0.017  0.010  0.008  0.013  0.63 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)   
               
n  23,674  16,328  13,438  23,674  23,674   
               
Age 20-55  0.005  -0.002  0.018  0.011  0.010  0.014  0.64 
  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)   
               
n  21,426  14,844  11,948  21,426  21,426   
               
Age 20-40  0.013  0.011  0.019  0.015  0.019  0.010  0.67 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.012)  (0.014)  (0.017)   
               
n  12,085  8,543  6,334  12,085  12,085   
               
Satisfaction with health (next year) 
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.005  -0.010  0.004  0.001  0.001  0.000  0.69 
  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.009)   
               
n  23,674  16,328  13,438  23,674  23,674   
               
Age 20-55  -0.007  -0.014  0.005  0.000  -0.001  0.002  0.69 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.009)   
               
n  21,426  14,844  11,948  21,426  21,426   
               
Age 20-40  -0.010  -0.014  -0.004  -0.012  -0.012  -0.012  0.72 
  (0.017)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.014)   
               
n  12,085  8,543  6,334  12,085  12,085   
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present (next year) is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health (next year) in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off 
estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The “pre-reform mean“ refers 
to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 





Table 13  
Effects on subjective health indicators for the sample of people with positive number of 
doctor visits 
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






Health at present   
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.012  -0.009  -0.020  -0.005  0.005  -0.017  0.61 
  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.018)   
               
n  15,664  10,790  8,906  15,664  15,664   
               
Age 20-55  -0.015  -0.012  -0.024  -0.010  -0.001  -0.021  0.61 
  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.018)  (0.020)  (0.020)   
               
n  13,903  9,631  7,724  13,903  13,903   
               
Age 20-40  -0.015  0.002  -0.053  -0.030  -0.010  -0.059*  0.64 
  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.032)   
               
n  7,637  5,411  3,977  7,637  7,637   
               
Satisfaction with health   
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.028*  -0.029*  -0.028  -0.009  -0.007  -0.011  0.67 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.013)   
               
n  15,664  10,790  8,906  15,664  15,664   
               
Age 20-55  -0.025  -0.027  -0.023  0.000  0.003  -0.003  0.67 
  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.012)  (0.015)  (0.014)   
               
n  13,903  9,631  7,724  13,903  13,903   
               
Age 20-40  -0.014  -0.011  -0.019  -0.018  -0.015  -0.023  0.69 
  (0.027)  (0.030)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.024)  (0.016)   
               
n  7,637  5,411  3,977  7,637  7,637   
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off estimates 
are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The “pre-reform mean“ refers to the 
treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.   
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Table 14  
Effects on subjective health indicators in the following year for the sample of people with 
positive number of doctor visits in the current year 
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






Health at present (next year) 
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  0.006  -0.000  0.017  0.013  0.014  0.013  0.60 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)   
               
n  15,652  10,780  8,898  15,652  15,652   
               
Age 20-55  0.006  -0.003  0.022  0.014  0.013  0.015  0.60 
  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.016)   
               
n  13,893  9,623  7,717  13,893  13,893   
               
Age 20-40  0.016  0.014  0.025  0.033*  0.045**  0.015  0.64 
  (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.030)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.024)   
               
n  7,633  5,409  3,974  7,633  7,633   
               
Satisfaction with health (next year) 
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.012  -0.017  -0.004  0.003  0.012  -0.009  0.66 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012)   
               
n  15,652  10,780  8,898  15,652  15,652   
               
Age 20-55  -0.014  -0.021  -0.003  0.005  0.013  -0.006  0.66 
  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)   
               
n  13,893  9,623  7,717  13,893  13,893   
               
Age 20-40  -0.009  -0.009  -0.007  0.012  0.029  -0.013  0.68 
  (0.022)  (0.024)  (0.028)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.019)   
               
n  7,633  5,409  3,974  7,633  7,633   
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present (next year) is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health (next year) in 11 different values. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-off 
estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The “pre-reform mean“ refers 
to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 







Table 15  
Effects on subjective health indicators for the sample of people with positive number of days 
in hospital  
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






Health at present   
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.036  -0.044  -0.025  0.045  0.113*  0.016  0.56 
  (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.045)  (0.061)  (0.067)  (0.064)   
               
n  2,183  1,533  1,242  2,183  2,183   
               
Age 20-55  -0.040  -0.066  -0.001  0.062  0.070  0.057  0.58 
  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.083)  (0.086)  (0.093)   
               
n  1,890  1,334  1,041  1,890  1,890   
               
Age 20-40  0.034  0.009  0.073  -  -  -  0.62 
  (0.058)  (0.056)  (0.072)         
               
n  1,034  726  555         
               
Satisfaction with health   
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.055  -0.071  -0.026  0.041  0.042  0.040  0.63 
  (0.049)  (0.051)  (0.049)  (0.045)  (0.057)  (0.049)   
               
n  2,183  1,533  1,242  2,183  2,183   
               
Age 20-55  -0.047  -0.073  -0.000  0.031  0.024  0.036  0.63 
  (0.064)  (0.064)  (0.062)  (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.031)   
               
n  1,890  1,334  1,041  1,890  1,890   
               
Age 20-40  0.106**  0.066  0.163***  -  -  -  0.66 
  (0.042)  (0.050)  (0.053)         
               
n  1,034  726  555         
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health in 11 different values. The OLS results for the age group 20-40 are only 
based on 29 persons who are in the treatment group in the treatment period. Hence, statistical 
inference on these coefficients may be invalid, so that we do not take the statistical significance of the 
positive coefficients for “Satisfaction with Health” seriously. We do not report fixed-effects estimates 
for this age group because we only have 10 persons with a within variation in the treatment indicator. 
For the age groups 20-64 and 20-55 the number of persons with a within-variation in the treatment 
indicator is 26 (13 switch on and 17 switch off) and 21 (11 switch on and 13 switch off), respectively. 
Hence, these estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-
off estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The “pre-reform mean“ 
refers to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 





Table 16  
Effects on subjective health indicators in the following year for the sample of people with 
positive number of days in hospital in the current year 
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






Health at present (next year) 
       
 
               
Age 20-64  0.002  0.010  -0.002  0.006  -0.066  0.038  0.52 
  (0.045)  (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.056)  (0.068)  (0.056)   
               
n  2,181  1,532  1,241  2,181  2,181   
               
Age 20-55  -0.008  -0.015  0.020  -0.021  -0.079  0.015  0.54 
  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.059)  (0.054)  (0.072)  (0.054)   
               
n  1,888  1,333  1,040  1,890  1,890   
               
Age 20-40  0.053  0.048  0.109  -  -  -  0.60 
  (0.064)  (0.060)  (0.071)         
               
n  1,033  725  555         
               
Satisfaction with health (next year) 
       
 
               
Age 20-64  -0.005  -0.002  0.004  -0.059  -0.062  -0.057  0.59 
  (0.041)  (0.044)  (0.050)  (0.053)  (0.065)  (0.054)   
               
n  2,181  1,532  1,241  2,181  2,181   
               
Age 20-55  -0.012  -0.022  0.022  -0.068  -0.079  -0.061  0.60 
  (0.047)  (0.050)  (0.057)  (0.056)  (0.063)  (0.061)   
               
n  1,888  1,333  1,040  1,890  1,890   
               
Age 20-40  0.001  -0.010  0.075  -  -  -  0.65 
  (0.057)  (0.061)  (0.071)         
               
n  1,033  725  555         
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. Both indicators 
range between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating very good health. Health at Present (next year) is coded in 5, 
Satisfaction with Health (next year) in 11 different values. The OLS results for the age group 20-40 
are only based on 29 persons who are in the treatment group in the treatment period. Hence, 
statistical inference on these coefficients may be invalid. We do not report fixed-effects estimates for 
this age group because we only have 10 persons with a within variation in the treatment indicator. For 
the age groups 20-64 and 20-55 the number of persons with a within-variation in the treatment 
indicator is 26 (13 switch on and 17 switch off) and 21 (11 switch on and 13 switch off), respectively. 
Hence, these estimates have to be taken with a grain of salt. The fixed-effects switch-on and switch-
off estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The “pre-reform mean“ 
refers to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 






Table 17  
Effects on continuous sickness for at least 6 weeks 
  
OLS  OLS –  
switch on 
OLS –  






6 continuous weeks ill 
   
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.024**  -0.018  -0.027**  -0.022*  -0.029**  -0.014  0.032 
  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.013)   
               
n  23,702  13,451  16,351  23,702  23,702   
               
Age 20-55  -0.032***  -0.035***  -0.031***  -0.034***  -0.036***  -0.031**  0.028 
  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.012)   
               
n  21,451  11,959  14,856  21,451  21,451   
               
Age 20-40  -0.021**  -0.029*  -0.019*  -0.015  -0.012  -0.018  0.020 
  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.013)   
               
n  12,097  6,338  8,552  12,097  12,097   
               
6 continuous weeks ill (next year) 
 
 
   
               
Age 20-64  -0.007  -0.009  -0.005  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  0.034 
  (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.011)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.013)   
               
n  23,702  13,451  16,351  23,702  23,702   
               
Age 20-55  -0.012  -0.019  -0.008  -0.008  -0.006  -0.010  0.031 
  (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)   
               
n  21,451  11,959  14,856  21,451  21,451   
               
Age 20-40  -0.016  -0.042*  -0.003  -0.002  0.013  -0.022  0.016 
  (0.010)  (0.023)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.012)  (0.016)   
               
n  12,097  6,338  8,552  12,097  12,097   
               
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The fixed-effects 
switch-on and switch-off estimates are obtained from a single fixed-effects regression equation. The 
“pre-reform mean“ refers to the treatment group in the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.   
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Table 18  
Effects on satisfaction with financial security in case of sickness 
  OLS switch-off  FE switch-off  Pre-reform mean 
 All workers       
       
20-64  0.014  -0.013  0.66 
n=5559  (0.020)  (0.019)   
       
20-55  0.027  -0.000  0.65 
n=4930  (0.020)  (0.018)   
       
20-40  0.007  0.000  0.63 
n=2388  (0.031)  (0.030)   
 Doctor visits > 0       
       
20-64  0.014  -0.033  0.64 
n=3,579  (0.026)  (0.030)   
       
20-55  0.032  -0.010  0.64 
n=3,103  (0.027)  (0.030)   
       
20-40  0.001  -0.000  0.62 
n=1,407  (0.045)  (0.050)   
 Days in hospital > 0       
20-64  0.105**  -  0.63 
n=662  (0.052)     
       
20-55  0.097*  -  0.63 
n=560  (0.055)     
       
20-40  -0.150**  -  0.64 
n=262  (0.067)     
       
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. The indicator 
ranges between 0 and 1 with 1 indicating a high satisfaction. The orgininal variable is coded in 11 
different values. The OLS result for the age groups 20-64, 20.55 and 20-40 for those who have been 
in hospital is only based on 59, 49 and 22 persons who are in the treatment group in the treatment 
period, respectively. Hence, statistical inference, especially on the negative point estimate for the age 
group 20-40 may be invalid, so that we do not take the statistical significance of this estimate 
seriously. We do not report fixed-effects estimates for the restriction on persons who were in hospital 
because we only have 3, 3, and 1 person with a within variation in the treatment indicator for the age 
groups 20-64, 20-55, and 20-40, respectively. The “pre-reform mean“ refers to the treatment group in 
the pre-treatment period 1994 and 1995. 
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Employee with collective agreement (control group) younger than 40
Employee without collective agreement (treatment group) younger than 40
 
 
Fig. 1. Number of days absent over time by treatment status and age group  
Note: We only observe the total number of days absent by calendar year, not the length of single spells of 
absence. The sample includes only firm stayers. 
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Individual is 


















1994  56,150  13,417  12,520  6,288  6,040  5,134 
1995  56,150  13,768  12,851  6,526  6,278  5,576 
1997  56,150  13,283  12,180  5,931  5,658  4,964 
1998  56,150  14,670  13,373  6,394  6,160  5,428 
1999  56,150  14,085  13,035  6,443  6,196  5,263 
2000  56,150  24,586  21,233  10,083  9,690  8,527 
n  336,900  93,809  85,192  41,665  40,022  34,892 




Table A2  
Selection of treatment and control groups 
Year  Treated  Control  Movers  Rest  n 
1994  1,021  3,702  0  411  5,134 
1995  1,206  4,322  0  48  5,576 
1997  585  2,691  962  726  4,964 
1998  471  2,353  1,104  1,500  5,428 
1999  845  2,956  0  1,462  5,263 
2000  775  2,775  0  4,977  8,527 
n  4,903  18,799  2,066  9,124  34,892 
Note: To be part of either the treatment or control group in this study, an individual must have 
answered the question on collective bargaining in 1995. Hence, the number of observations is highest 
for both treated and control individuals in 1995. Panel attrition then works both backward and forward 
in time. So that observations can be classified into treatment and control, a worker must not have 
changed employer between 1996 and 1998 (i.e., until the end of the treatment period). Workers that 
have changed (termed “movers”) are deleted from the sample. If, however, an individual answered 
the question on collective bargaining coverage in 1995 but changed employer before 1995 or in 
1999/2000, we retain that employee in the sample. The last column, labeled “rest,” includes workers 
who did not answer the question on collective bargaining in 1995, meaning that they cannot be 
classified as either treated or control and are therefore deleted from the sample. The allocation to the 
treatment or control group here is based on the 1995 information on collective bargaining coverage. It 
should also be noted that misclassification outside the treatment period is harmless because neither 
the treatment nor the control group was treated either before or after the repeal of the reform. Thus, 
keeping all persons who answered the 1995 question on collective bargaining coverage may improve 
precision in the repeated cross-section difference-in-differences estimates. In the fixed-effects 
estimates, the coefficient on treatment is driven only by observations present at least once in the 
treatment period and at least once in a non-treatment period.  
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Table A3  
Full estimation results  
   OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
No collective agreement  -1.02  -0.93   
  (0.79)  (0.65)   
Year 1995  0.58  0.79*  0.20 
  (0.58)  (0.47)  (0.54) 
Year 1997  0.04  0.35  0.35 
  (1.18)  (0.68)  (1.08) 
Year 1998  1.80  1.29*  1.42 
  (1.27)  (0.71)  (1.09) 
Year 1999  -0.02  0.18  -0.16 
  (0.81)  (0.58)  (0.76) 
Year 2000  1.05  0.47   
  (0.96)  (0.59)   
No coll. agreem.   Year of Reform   -1.99  -2.07**  -1.24 
  (1.33)  (0.91)  (1.22) 
Unemployment rate  0.04  -0.05  -1.33 
  (0.18)  (0.10)  (1.54) 
Hourly wage  -1.74*  -1.58*  -0.11 
  (0.98)  (0.82)  (0.29) 
Civil status indicators       
Age  -0.14  -0.27  -2.71*** 
  (0.39)  (0.22)  (0.86) 
Age squared  0.00  0.00  0.04*** 
  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Married  0.34  -0.06  -1.27 
  (1.46)  (0.81)  (1.67) 
Female  1.94  -3.14   
  (9.89)  (6.29)   
Children younger than 16  -2.12**  -1.08*  0.79 
  (0.86)  (0.63)  (1.80) 
Female   children younger than 16  -2.21  -1.68*  -1.40 
  (1.83)  (0.99)  (2.65) 
Female   Married  -0.09  0.31  1.88* 
  (0.55)  (0.35)  (1.06) 
Female   age  0.00  0.00  -0.02* 
  (0.01)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
Female   age squared  3.28**  1.60  0.11 
  (1.32)  (1.14)  (2.18) 
Education (ref. Apprenticeship)       
Higher education (university degree)  -1.88**  -2.41***  -1.47 
  (0.92)  (0.65)  (1.22) 
Higher education (no degree)  -0.14  0.07  3.34** 
  (0.78)  (0.58)  (1.34) 
No degree  0.95  0.27  4.92* 
  (0.99)  (0.60)  (2.88) 
       
Job and firm characteristics       
Temporary work contract  0.41  -0.10  -1.51 
  (1.74)  (1.09)  (2.70) 
Working fulltime  3.91***  3.24***  2.58* 
  (0.81)  (0.51)  (1.49)  
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Table A3 (continued) 
  
OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
Job and firm characteristics       
Blue-collar worker  4.18***  4.57***  3.26** 
  (0.78)  (0.64)  (1.58) 
Civil servant  3.15  3.22**  -0.63 
  (2.10)  (1.33)  (2.88) 
Citizenship       
German  -1.81  -1.17  1.86 
  (1.12)  (0.80)  (3.29) 
West-Germany  0.94  -0.20  -3.06 
  (1.37)  (0.87)  (2.74) 
Firm size (ref. 1-19)       
Firm size (20-199)  2.42***  2.04***  -0.06 
  (0.77)  (0.67)  (1.37) 
Firm size (200-1999)  2.17**  2.29***  -1.63 
  (0.86)  (0.73)  (1.51) 
Firm size (>2000)  3.45***  3.36***  -1.39 
  (0.88)  (0.79)  (1.72) 
Tenure (ref. < 1 year)       
Tenure (1-3 years)  -0.08  -0.06  3.30* 
  (1.65)  (1.45)  (2.00) 
Tenure (3-5 years)  1.21  1.13  4.66*** 
  (1.66)  (1.60)  (1.46) 
Tenure (5-10 years)  0.03  0.60  4.22*** 
  (1.56)  (1.54)  (1.55) 
Tenure (10-15 years)  0.01  -0.37  3.63** 
  (1.65)  (1.46)  (1.65) 
Tenure (15-20 years)  -0.26  0.01  3.93** 
  (1.68)  (1.55)  (1.80) 
Tenure (>20 years)  0.46  0.03  5.91*** 
  (1.72)  (1.53)  (2.23) 
Industry (ref. manufacturing)       
Agriculture, hunting and forestry  -2.81*  -0.78  -2.21 
  (1.47)  (1.47)  (2.10) 
Mining and quarrying  5.64  7.80  17.82 
  (7.77)  (8.80)  (17.60) 
Electricity, gas and water supply  -1.66  -0.46  -1.64 
  (1.22)  (1.12)  (2.02) 
Construction  1.07  1.22  1.78 
  (1.10)  (0.84)  (1.64) 
Wholesale & retail trade  0.33  0.65  0.31 
  (0.88)  (0.84)  (1.96) 
Transport and communication  4.81**  3.56***  1.46 
  (2.18)  (1.34)  (2.11) 
Financial intermediation  -0.36  -0.60  -1.67 
  (0.89)  (0.81)  (2.29) 
Real estate and business activities  0.59  1.22  0.90 
  (1.04)  (0.95)  (1.64) 
Public administration and defence  0.59  1.29  -0.67 
  (1.43)  (0.87)  (1.93) 
Education  -0.26  0.59  1.24 
  (1.49)  (1.07)  (2.88)  
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Table A3 (continued)  
  
OLS  NEGBIN  FE 
Industry (ref. manufacturing)       
Health and social work  2.84**  2.50***  0.04 
  (1.23)  (0.95)  (1.79) 
Other social & personal service   2.28*  2.74*  1.96 
  (1.28)  (1.56)  (1.77) 
Health at present  
(ref. satisfactory)       
Very poor  38.52***  21.65***  30.70*** 
  (6.40)  (4.06)  (6.07) 
 Poor  11.54***  6.69***  8.16*** 
  (1.52)  (1.02)  (2.16) 
Good  -2.47***  -2.66***  -1.06 
  (0.58)  (0.43)  (0.75) 
Very good  -5.02***  -4.66***  -1.73* 
  (0.86)  (0.56)  (0.96) 
Satisfaction with health  
(ref. satisfactory)       
Very poor  7.59  4.84**  1.76 
  (6.44)  (2.35)  (6.75) 
 Poor  4.32**  2.24***  3.50* 
  (1.79)  (0.85)  (2.10) 
Good  -1.96***  -2.14***  -1.94*** 
  (0.56)  (0.41)  (0.72) 
Very good  -1.22  -1.60***  -1.15 
  (0.84)  (0.60)  (0.88) 
n  23,702  23,702  23,702 
R
2  0.11     0.04 
Note: *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), own calculations.  
 